On September 18, 1998, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers — ICANN — was incorporated in California. This new organization would inherit responsibility for DNS management, IP address allocation, and protocol parameter assignment from the informal arrangements that had governed the internet for decades. ICANN’s creation was controversial, its structure was complex, and its influence would grow to shape the global internet.
Why ICANN Was Created
Several converging pressures made ICANN necessary:
The Death of Informality
Jon Postel had run IANA from his office at USC-ISI. It worked because everyone trusted Jon. But:
- There was no succession plan
- There were no formal contracts
- There was no accountability structure
- There was no international legitimacy
When Postel redirected root servers in January 1998, he demonstrated both the power of informal control and its risks.
The NSI Problem
Network Solutions’ monopoly generated enormous profits and enormous complaints. Competition required a governance structure to:
- Set rules for registrars
- Manage the shared registry
- Handle disputes
- Protect against monopoly abuse
Someone had to coordinate this. NSI wasn’t trusted. The government wanted to privatize. A new organization was needed.
International Legitimacy
The internet was global; its governance was American. Creating an international organization — even one under US oversight — provided legitimacy that informal US control lacked.
Policy Implementation
The White Paper required someone to implement its principles. That meant creating an organization to:
- Assume IANA functions
- Introduce registration competition
- Add new TLDs
- Develop dispute resolution policies
The Founding Process
ICANN didn’t emerge from a democratic process. It was crafted through negotiations among interested parties.
The Initial Board
The first ICANN board was selected by IANA and approved by the US government — not elected by anyone. The interim board included:
- Esther Dyson (Chair) — Technology investor and commentator
- Geraldine Capdeboscq — Bull S.A. executive (France)
- George Conrades — BBN executive
- Greg Crew — Australian IT leader
- Frank Fitzsimmons — Deputy CIO, US Social Security Administration
- Hans Kraaijenbrink — Dutch Telecom executive
- Jun Murai — Japanese internet pioneer
- Eugenio Triana — Spanish technology official
- Linda Wilson — Radcliffe College president
This was an appointed body charged with building permanent governance.
Jon Postel’s Role
Postel was deeply involved in ICANN’s creation, drafting early proposals and helping design the structure. He was expected to have a leading role in the new organization.
His death on October 16, 1998 — less than a month after ICANN’s incorporation — shocked the community and removed the most trusted figure in internet governance.
NTIA Relationship
From the start, ICANN operated under agreements with the US government:
- Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Commerce Department
- IANA Functions Contract with NTIA
- US government retained authority over root zone changes
This contractual relationship gave the US government formal oversight while allowing ICANN operational independence.
ICANN’s Structure
ICANN developed a complex structure reflecting its multistakeholder mandate:
The Board
The ICANN Board of Directors is the ultimate authority. Board members come from:
- Nominating Committee selections
- Supporting Organization representatives
- At-Large community representatives
Board size has varied; it’s currently 16 voting members plus non-voting liaisons.
Supporting Organizations
Three Supporting Organizations advise the Board and develop policy:
GNSO (Generic Names Supporting Organization): Develops policy for generic TLDs (.com, .net, .org, new gTLDs). Includes registries, registrars, commercial users, and non-commercial users.
ccNSO (Country Code Names Supporting Organization): Coordinates policy for country-code TLDs (.us, .uk, .de, etc.). ccTLD managers participate voluntarily.
ASO (Address Supporting Organization): Handles IP address allocation policy. Links to Regional Internet Registries (ARIN, RIPE, APNIC, etc.).
Advisory Committees
Advisory Committees provide input on specific topics:
- GAC (Governmental Advisory Committee): Governments advise on public policy
- SSAC (Security and Stability Advisory Committee): Technical security advice
- RSSAC (Root Server System Advisory Committee): Root server operations
- At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC): Individual internet users
The IANA Functions
ICANN took over IANA responsibilities:
- Root zone management
- Protocol parameter registries
- IP address allocation oversight
These functions were technically performed by ICANN staff but under contract with NTIA.
Early Controversies
ICANN’s first years were turbulent:
Legitimacy Questions
Who gave ICANN authority? The Board was appointed, not elected. The structure emerged from negotiations, not democracy. Critics called it a “private government” without accountability.
Transparency Concerns
Early ICANN meetings had limited public access. Decision-making was opaque. This improved over time, but the reputation for secrecy persisted.
US Government Control
Despite claims of internationalization, the US government retained real authority. NTIA could veto root zone changes. The IANA contract gave the US leverage.
Mission Creep
ICANN was supposed to handle “technical coordination.” But what counted as technical? Adding new TLDs? Dispute resolution? Privacy policy? The boundary was contested.
NSI Battles
NSI fought to protect its position. Negotiations over registry agreements, competition introduction, and data access were contentious for years.
Key Early Decisions
ICANN made several foundational decisions:
The UDRP (1999)
The Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy created a process for resolving trademark disputes without litigation. Complainants could challenge domain registrations through arbitration. This addressed the cybersquatting crisis.
The SRS (1999)
The Shared Registration System enabled multiple registrars to compete. NSI had to share registry access. This broke the monopoly.
New gTLD Deferrals
ICANN initially avoided adding new gTLDs, focusing on stabilizing existing systems. New TLD rounds came later (2000, 2012).
Accreditation System
ICANN created accreditation requirements for registrars, ensuring minimum standards for domain registration services.
The At-Large Experiment (2000)
In 2000, ICANN attempted global elections for At-Large board members. Internet users worldwide could register to vote.
Results:
- Over 150,000 voters registered
- Five directors were elected
- Regional representation was achieved
But the experiment was expensive, contentious, and criticized as susceptible to manipulation. Direct elections were later scaled back.
Evolution
ICANN has evolved significantly since 1998:
Growing Scope
From managing existing TLDs, ICANN expanded to adding hundreds of new gTLDs through the 2012 program.
Increased Transparency
After early criticism, ICANN improved public access to meetings, documents, and decision-making.
International Growth
ICANN opened offices worldwide and increased non-US participation in governance.
IANA Transition (2016)
In 2016, the US government transferred IANA oversight from NTIA to the “ICANN community” — ending direct US government control.
Key Takeaways
- ICANN was incorporated September 18, 1998, to manage DNS and IP allocation
- Created in response to NSI monopoly, IANA informality, and international pressure
- Operates under multistakeholder model with Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees
- Initial board was appointed, leading to legitimacy questions
- Jon Postel helped design ICANN but died shortly after incorporation
- US government retained authority through NTIA contracts until 2016
- Key early actions: UDRP (disputes), SRS (competition), registrar accreditation
Next
With ICANN established, the next challenge was ending NSI’s monopoly. The Shared Registration System would introduce competition to domain registration, transforming the industry.